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REPORT
ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION REVIEW
To the Board of Governors,
The City Club of Portland:
I. INTRODUCTION
Your Committee received the following charge from the Board of Governors:
(1) Report on the reasons why, after enactment of the 1960 amendment
authorizing revision of the Constitution, and after a comprehensive
study by the Constitutional Revision Commission, no revised Constitu-
tion has been submitted to the voters of Oregon;
(2) Identify the areas of substantive policy on which there appears to be
substantial agreement;
(3) Identify the major areas of substantive policy on which there appears
to be substantial disagreement delaying legislative submission of a
revised Constitution to the voters;
(4) Where these areas of disagreement can be identified as a choice among
two or more well-defined positions, indicate which substantive policy
should be incorporated in the revised Constitution.
The Committee should also analyze the available procedures for con-
stitutional revision in Oregon and identify any factors in those procedures
which have contributed to preventing a revised Constitution from being
submitted to the people thus far. The Committee should also consider and
recommend whether the procedures now provided in the Oregon Consti-
tution for revising it should be amended, such as by permitting a revised
Constitution to be proposed by initiative or by reducing the two-thirds
legislative majority necessary to refer a revised Constitution to the people
for vote, or otherwise.
No date was fixed for the submission of this report, but the hope was expressed
that it would be submitted to the membership early in 1967. The Committee
recognized that to be of the most value to the membership, the general public and
the legislature, the report should precede final consideration of constitutional
revision by the 1967 Legislative Assembly.
Committee members arc: George M. Joseph, Attorney, Morrison & Bailey,
Chairman; Roy F. Bessey, Planning Consultant; Kent E. Clark, Public Relations
Representative, Crown Zellerbach Corporation; Howard E. Dean, Chairman,
Political Science Department, Portland State College; James W. Durham, Jr.,
Attorney, Davies, Biggs, Strayer, Stoel and Bolev; Frank H. Eiseman, CPA,
Erickson, Eiseman & Co.; Hugh McGilvra, publisher, Washington County News,
Times and State Representative, Washington County; Hardy Myers, Jr., Attorney,
Bonyhadi & Hall; and Frances A. Staten, President, Acme Metal Works.
II. SCOPE OF RESEARCH AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Because the available time was short, the Committee focused its attention on
these fundamental questions:
(1) Is there a present, urgent need for constitutional revision?
(2) What has been the history of constitutional revision in Oregon?
(3) What are the most serious obstacles to legislative agreement on submission
of a substantially new or materially revised Constitution for approval by
the voters?
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(4) What are the prospects for legislative action in 1967?
(5) What sort of revised Constitution would have a reasonable chance for
approval by the people?
It should be recognized that these necessarily embrace a multitude of related
questions. The Committee agreed that it should not and could not undertake
to review completely all the work that has already been done (work out-
standing both in quality and quantity), nor would it attempt to put before the
membership what it would consider a perfect constitution. The Committee has
squarely faced the overriding fact that, however interesting it may be to speculate
about what would be theoretically the "best" Constitution for Oregon, what will
actually be submitted to the people and accepted by them is a matter of practical
politics. It is contemplated that the Committee will report at a later time on the
progress of constitutional revision in the 1967 Legislature.
The Committee has relied on two general sources: (1) Texts, studies, reports and
recommendations of individuals and organizations, private and public, concerned
with state government and constitutional revision; (2) Interviews. The former
include:
1. GOVERNMENT REPORTS: OREGON
Consolidation Commission of the State of Oregon, Report, 1919.
Joint Commission on Administrative Reorganization, Report, 1930.
Legislative Interim Committee on Governmental and Administrative Reorganization,
and Governmental Research Committee of the Oregon State Planning Board, Joint
Report on State Governmental and Administrative Reorganization in Oregon, 1937.
Oregon State Planning Board, Morris S. Isseks, History of State Administrative Agencies
in Oregon, 1939.
Legislative Interim Committee on State Government Administration, Report, 1951.
Legislative Interim Committee on Government Reorganization, State Government
Organization in Oregon, 1958, Proposals for a Progressive and Continuing Program of
Reorganization, Dec. 1958.
Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial Administration, Report, 1959.
Governor Mark O. Hatfield, Recommendations for Reorganization of the Executive
Branch, submitted to the 51st Legislative Assembly, Dec. 1960.
Commission for Constitutional Revision, A Neiv Constitution for Oregon, Report to the
Governor and the 52nd Legislative Assembly, Dec. 1962.
Oregon Legislative Assembly, issues of Journal and Final Legislative Calendar, 1951-
1965.
2. GOVERNMENT REPORTS: UNITED STATES
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Kestnbaum Commission), A Report to
the President for Transmittal to the Congress, 1955.
Joint Federal-State Action Committee Reports, 1957-59.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, To Improve the Effectiveness
of the American Federal System Through Increased Cooperation Among National,
State, and Local Levels of Government, June 1, 1965, and other publications.
3. REPORTS OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ASSOCIATIONS
City Club of Portland, Bulletin, Nov. 4, 1960, including report on measure Authorizing
Legislation to Propose Revised Constitution.
Citizens Committee for Revision of the Oregon Constitution, Proposed Revision of the
Oregon Constitution, 1964.
League of Women Voters of Oregon, Sense, Sentiment, and the Oregon Constitution,
1962.
National Civic Review, January, 1967 (William W. Soranton, Joseph D. Tydings,
Julia D. Stuart).
National Municipal League, State Constitutional Studies Project (1960-63), including:
Robert Dishman, The Shape of the Document;
Fennel Heady, The Structure of Administration;
John P. Wheeler, Jr., Salient Issues of Constitutional Revision.
National Municipal League, Model State Constitution, 1921-63.
Oregon Farm Bureau Federation, Policy 1966, Dec. 1965.
Oregon State Bar, Committee on Constitutional Revision, Report, March 1963.
Oregon State Bar, Committee Reports, Supplement on Proposal of Constitutional
Revision Commission for Revised Constitution for Oregon, Sept. 1962.
P O R T L A N D C I T Y C L U B B U L L E T I N 207
4. BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Charles R. Adrian, State and Local Government, 1967.
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Intergovernmental Pidations in
the United States, Annals, May 1965.
American Assembly, The Forty-eight States, 1955.
American Assembly, Goals for Americans: The Report of the President's Committee
on 'National Goals, 1960.
William Anderson, Clara Penniman, Edward W. Wcidncr, Government in the Fifty
States, 1963.
James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1888, 1933.
Arthur E. Buck, reorganization of State Governments, 1938.
Charles Henry Carey, The Constitution of Oregon, 1926.
Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism, 1966.
Daniel R. Grant, H. C. Nixon, State and Local Government in America, 1963.
W. Brooke Graves, ed., State Constitutional Revision, 1960.
W. Brooke Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations, 1964.
Claudius O. Johnson, H. Paul Castleberry, Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., American State and
Local Governments, 1964.
Arthur W. Macmahon, ed., Federalism, Mature and Fmergent, 1956.
Russell W. Maddox, Robert F. Fuquay, State and Local Government, 1966.
Charles E. Merriam, ed., A History of American Political Theories, 1924.
Charles E. Merriam, Robert E. Merriam, The American Government: Democracy in
Action, 1954.
Frederic A. Ogg, Essentials of American Government, 1954.
Nelson A. Rockefeller, The Future of Federalism, 1962.
Clinton Rossitcr, "The Democratic Process," in Goals for Americans, Report of the
President's Commission on National Goals, American Assembly, 1960.
Donald C. Rowat, The Ombudsman, Citizen's Defender, 1965.
John M. Swarthout, Ernest R. Bartley, Principles and Policies of State and Local
Government, 1958.
Harvey Walker, "The Office of Lieutenant Governor," State Government, Autumn,
1966.
Interviews have been held with the following people:
Forest W. Amsden, formerly Executive Secretary, Commission for Constitutional
Revision.
Mrs. Frank Anderson, Chairman, Legislative Committee, League of Women Voters
of Oregon.
Victor Atiych, Senator, Washington County, Oregon Legislative Assembly.
Clarence Barton, former Speaker, Oregon House of Representatives; member, Com-
mission for Constitutional Revision.
George Brown, Director, Committee for Political Education, Oregon AFL-CIO.
John R. Dellenback, United States Representative; former Representative, Jackson
County, Oregon Legislative Assembly.
Mark O. Hatfield, United States Senator; former Governor, State of Oregon.
Robert D. Holmes, former Governor, State of Oregon; member, Commission for
Constitutional Revision.
Randall B. Kester, attorney, Maguire, Shields, Kester, and Cosgrave; member, Oregon
State Bar Committee on Constitutional Revision.
Hans A. Linde, Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; member,
Commission for Constitutional Revision.
Thomas R. Mahoney, Senator, Multnomah County, Oregon Legislative Assembly;
member, Commission for Constitutional Revision.
. Tom McCall, Governor, State of Oregon; former Secretary of State, State of Oregon.
Charles McKinley, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Reed College; former
Professor of Political Science, Portland State College.
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery, Speaker, House of Representatives, Oregon Legislative
Assembly.
John D. Mosscr, Director, Department of Finance and Administration, State of Oregon;
former Representative, Washington County, Oregon Legislative Assembly.
Herbert M. Schwab, attorney, Rives & Rodgers; member, Commission for Constitutional
Revision.
Charles A. Sprague, editor and publisher, Oregon Statesman, Salem; former Governor,
State of Oregon.
Thomas H. Tongue, attorney, Hicks, Tongue, Dale and Strader; Chairman, Oregon
State Bar Committee on Judicial Administration.
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Mrs. S. N. Stanley, President, League of Women Voters of Oregon.
Allen Wheeler, Master, Oregon State Grange.
Don S. Willner, Senator, Multnomah County, Oregon Legislative Assembly.
Most of the interviews were conducted by the full Committee. Individual
members or subcommittees undertook research on particular questions. It is
appropriate to note the unstinting cooperation given members of the Committee
by every person interviewed and to express the Committee's appreciation for the
frankness with which witnesses have responded to its inquiries. Material in the
body of this report reflects reliance on the bibliographical material, and even if it
is used without attribution, acknowledgment should be understood.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Oregon's present Constitution has passed its 109th birthday. Today its authors
would recognize it as basically unchanged since 1857, even though it has been
frequently amended. It was drafted by a convention in August and September of
that year, approved by the people in November and accepted by Congress in 1859.
The draftsmen relied very heavily on the 1851 Constitution of Indiana, then
considered a modern constitution.
The document contained an extensive Bill of Rights. The government was
based on the usual separation of powers into three branches: legislative, executive,
and judicial. Executive authority was divided among a Governor, a Secretary of
State, and a Treasurer. The executive branch was not intended to have great power.
The document emphasized economy and popular election of public officials. Charles
H. Carey (The Oregon Constitution, pp. 55-56) epitomized the conventions product
in this way:
The constitution as framed by the convention and accepted by the
people proved to be well adapted to the requirements of the new state.
While perhaps it was a little tight in places, on the whole it was a model
instrument for just such a state and just such a people. The pioneers, none
of whom was wealthy, and many of whom had known the pinch of hard
times and had suffered from scarcity of the comforts of life, rather approved
of the spirit of economy that pervaded the various articles and sections.
They liked the restrictions upon public indebtedness and the prohibitions
upon the use of public credit. It was a virtue of the constitution that it
limited salaries of public officers to the lowest practicable degree, and that
in the interest of economy the sessions of the legislative assembly were to
be biennial, instead of the annual sessions of the territorial period. There
was no useless lieutenant-governor, and no attorney-general to be paid for.
The governor was required to serve as superintendent of schools, while the
secretary of state was to discharge the duties of a state auditor. Roads
were needed, but the legislature was forbidden to pass special road laws,
thus avoiding the danger of log-rolling and trading for local roads in the
legislative sessions, and eliminating the temptation to extravagant expendi-
ture in a campaign of road building. The Supreme Court judges were
required to do circuit duty; county judges had judicial duties, but also
served with the county commissioners in the transaction of county business;
and the county clerks were also recorders of conveyances. These, and many
other economies, characterized the constitution and made it acceptable.
Throughout the instrument there was evident an intentional design to
create limitations upon the exercise of power by the people themselves.
Assuming that as voters they had all powers of state government not
actually surrendered, thev deliberately put bounds to what could be done
constitutionally, and in this they carefully followed the models that had
been tested by experience elsewhere. It was as though they knew that the
expression of the popular will, or the popular desire, might lead to
extravagance in action or in expenditures, and they chose to adopt restraints
jn the interest of good government.
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Amendment was a difficult process, and the Constitution remained unchanged
until 1902, when the people adopted the "Oregon system" of initiative, refer-
endum and recall, and the amendment parade began. In the first decade it was
amended 19 times by the initiative process alone, liver since 1906, a feature of
Oregon political life has been that constitutional amendments are all too frequently
presented to the voters by the initiative or by referendum by the legislature. The
result has been 115 amendments, of which 26 have been to Article XI, which
deals with public debt. Most of the amendments, particularly those referred by the
legislature, have dealt with the details of government and not with basic structure
or philosophy. Many were designed for the benefit of special interests.
IV. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
To date changes in Oregon's Constitution have been achieved solely by amend-
ment, a process which has been aptly described as "greasing the squeaking wheel."
The amendments have met specific problems with specific solutions, and no major
large-scale revision has ever been made. In addition to constitutional changes by
amendment, Oregon's governmental structure has been significantly developed
through legislation. Many important features of our state government arc purely
legislative in origin. For example, the Board of Control (consisting of the Governor,
Secretary of State, and Treasurer) was created by statute in 1913 for the purpose
of administering state institutions. The Board eventually developed into the main
agency of fiscal and administrative control, but subsequently its functions were
reduced to practically their original scope.
The major departments of the executive branch are legislative creations:
Agriculture, Commerce, Finance and Administration, Forestry, Motor Vehicles,
Police, Veterans' Affairs. The positions of Attorney General and Labor Commis-
sioner were created by statute. Through legislation also has come the profusion of
state boards and commissions, such as: Fish and Game Commissions, Board of
Aeronautics, Chewings Fescue and Creeping lied Fescue Commission, Board of
Education, Board of Health, Board of Higher Education, Civil Service Commission,
Filbert Commission, Bureau of Labor, Board of Medical Examiners, Liquor Control
Commission, Workmen's Compensation Board, Board of Pharmacy, Public Welfare
Commission, Racing Commission, State Tax Commission, and many others.
Although Oregon's constitutional and governmental structures have often been
altered by amendment and legislation, the main outlines have remained relatively
unchanged. But the social environment within which our state governmental
system operates has undergone sweeping changes. Oregon's population grew from
about 50,000 in lcS60 to over a million in 1940 and is nearly two million today.
In 1860, Oregon's economy was predominantly agricultural; today, forestry,
tourism, manufacturing, trade and distribution, and service occupations play major
roles in the state's economy. Only about seven per cent of the employed civilian
labor force is now in agriculture, whereas manufacturing employs nearly a quarter
of the labor force. With the growth in population and the changing economy, there
has been a dramatic growth of urbanism and suburbanism. Portland has become
a large metropolitan area; Salem, Eugene and Medford have developed substan-
tially. The population of Oregon was less than a third urban in 1900, more than
half urban in 1950, and is now two-thirds urban.
With growing numbers of people, greater urban and metropolitan concentra-
tions, expanding production, and more intensive use of resources, there have also
come increasing threats to the environment, its safety and liveability, most notably
through the accelerating pollution of our air, water and land. With these changes
in the social and economic environment and with the growing problems of our
complex society, there are increasing demands on government at all levels—
national, state, and local—for more and better services and more effective regula-
tion. This mav be seen in the steadily growing expenditures in fields such as
education, health, social welfare, highways, conservation, recreation, police and
fire protection.
The United States in 1800 was a rural, agrarian society of some four million
people, concentrated chiefly along the Eastern Seaboard. Today it is a predominately
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urban, metropolitan, industrial nation of sonic two-hundred million people. A
significant shift in the balance of power in the American federal system has
accompanied this change. The national government has become dominant, and
there is an increasingly complex pattern of intergovernmental relations between
the states and the national government, between state and local governments, and
between the cities and the national government. The federal government and the
state governments are increasingly involved in an intricate network of inter-
relationships in social security, public welfare, highway construction, resource
conservation, urban renewal, housing, and other areas. Also, a rapidly developing
pattern of direct federal aid to cities and other local units is being established. The
continuing concern of the national government with urban problems has been
underscored by the establishment of the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development. It is apparent that although the relationships among the national-
state-local levels of our federal system could once have been described as a "layer-
cake" arrangement, the "marble-cake" image more aptly describes today's situation.
The shifting of power to the national government has led to considerable alarm
and has occasioned much thought about how to halt or even to reverse the trend.
The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Kestnbaum Commission) and
the Joint Federal-State Action Committee, both appointed during the Eisenhower
administration, had this problem as their major focus, and it is under continuing
study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations established by
Congress in 1959. Whatever may be the results of efforts to alter the trend toward
greater federal government involvement in state and local affairs, it is noteworthy
that no effective means of stemming the tide has yet been found. Indeed, despite
its great desire to make major recommndations, the Joint Federal-State Action
Committee found only two federal programs which it concluded should be
returned to the states: vocational education, and the construction of municipal
waste treatment plants.
In their concern with the growing power of the national government, many
people seem to have overlooked that just as the functions and responsibilities of the
national government have increased tremendously, so have those of state and local
governments. State government revenues and expenditures from their own sources
have approximately tripled since 1948. A comparison of the percentage increase
in revenues, expenditures, and civilian employment since 1949 shows that the state
and local governments have had a larger percentage increase in expenditures and
civilian employment than has the national government while there has been an
equal percentage increase in revenues. In 1965 approximately 136 billion dollars
was spent for goods and services bv all levels of government in the United States.
More than fifty per cent of this total was expended by state and local governments.
If national defense spending is not included in the total, state and local governments'
outlays (including grants from the federal government) are more than four times
those by the national government directly. Certainly it is still true, as one scholar
has recently said, that "our states, located between the federal government and the
burgeoning local governments in a metropolitani/ing nation, are the keystones of
the American governmental arch." Emphasizing the states' continuing role as
important managers and innovators, it has been said:
They have become even more active promoters and administrators of public
services than ever before. In part, this is simply because governments are
doing more than they had in the past, but it is also because they provide
ways to increase governmental activity while maintaining non-centralized
government. By handling important programs at a level that can be reached
by many people, they contribute to the maintenance of a traditional interest
of democratic politics, namely, the maximization of local control over the
political and administrative decision makers whose actions affect the lives
of every citizen. (Elazar, American Federalism.)
Because of their ever-growing responsibilities and increasingly complex rela-
tionships with the national and local governments, it is necessary that state govern-
ments be able to discharge their responsibilities more effectively and more respon-
sibly. Speaking of the compelling need for more active and efficient state and local
government, the distinguished political scientist Clinton Rossiter has said:
A strengthening of these governments would take us far toward solving the
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social problems that now beset us, and would do more to quiet fears of
centralization than would any other program of action. The way to reverse
the flow of power to Washington, to the extent that it can or should be
reversed, is not to weaken the national government but to bolster state and
local governments. The states in particular have too important a part to
play in the American system to be permitted the outworn luxuries of
absurdly detailed constitutions, hog-tied governors, shamefully gerry-
mandered electoral districts, pressure-ridden legislatures, and chaotic ad-
ministrations. (Goals for Americans)
The necessity for strengthening the state governments has become increasingly
apparent as the solution of the critical problems facing them has become more
urgent. Discontent with ineffective state governments led to numerous attempts
in many states during the past sixty years to bring about reorganization. One of
the country's earliest significant efforts came in Oregon in 1909 when the Peoples
Power League proposed its plan for reorganization of the state government. That
plan would have limited the number of elective officials to two (the Governor and
the Auditor) and transferred the functions of 46 boards and commissions to seven
departments headed by officials appointed by the Governor. Shortly thereafter,
Governor Charles Evans Hughes recommended similar reorganization for New
York. Between 1917—when Governor Lowden's comprehensive reorganization
plan was adopted in Illinois—and the end of the 1930s, many states had joined
in the reorganization movement.
In Oregon, proposals emphasizing the need for administrative integration
through consolidation and departmentalization were made at various times: in
1917-19, in the 1920's, and down to the 1960's (sec Appendix A). Through these
efforts some piecemeal reorganization was achieved by creation of new departments.
In 1934, consolidation in state government was an issue in the gubernatorial cam-
paign, and Governor Martin recommended to the 1935 Legislature a program of
comprehensive departmentalization of administrative functions.
Although a wide variety of ideas has been involved in the numerous reorgani-
zation efforts since 1909, certain basic principles have been consistently emphasized
by political scientists, specialists in public administration, and others:
(1) Departmentalization, or integration of administrative agencies according
to function;
(2) Concentration of administrative authority and responsibility in the
Governor;
(3) Limitation of boards and commissions to advice, consultation and review
as contrasted with purely administrative work;
(4) Provision of more adequate staff services responsible to the Governor for
purchasing, budgeting, accounting, personnel, planning, management analysis, and
strengthening the Governor's own staff;
(5) Establishment of an independent post-audit (distinct from the financial
control and accounting functions of the executive) under the direction of an official
responsible to the legislature.
Following World War II, reorganization efforts were resumed in more than
twenty states when the "little Hoover Commissions" were established. Oregon's
was created in 1949 as the Legislative Interim Committee on State Government
Reorganization. Its report placed major emphasis upon the need for better financial
controls and central state services and recommended a Department of Finance and
Administration, which the legislature established in 1951.
In 1959, another Legislative Interim Committee recommended a number of
proposals, which included establishment of a Department of Natural Resources
and a Department of Revenue; strengthening the Governor's staff; improving fiscal
management, and provision of central services for boards and commissions. The
report proposed that these goals be achieved through legislation and executive
orders, avoiding the recommendation of measures which might have required
constitutional amendment. The legislature provided for a Legislative Fiscal Officer,
but did not otherwise implement that Committee's report.
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The most recent effort at reorganization began with the appointment by
Governor Llatfiekl of an Advisory Committee (of which former Governors Sprague
and Holmes were respectively Chairman and Vice-Chairman) to study the organi-
zational needs of the executive branch. The committee recommended action to
reduce the number of separate agencies by consolidating functions. Subsequently,
Governor Hatficld submitted to the 1961 Legislature a series of reorganization
proposals designed to make government more responsive to the people, achieve
greater efficiency, improve coordination, and provide more effective service. The
proposals, to be achieved through legislation, would have grouped executive func-
tions in eight departments: Labor, Commerce, Social Services, Public Safety,
Transportation and Utilities, General Government Services, Natural Resources,
and a Department of Education to be established later. The only result of these
efforts was the creation of a temporary Department of Commerce.
Since 1920 the City Club has made 28 studies (see Appendix B) dealing with
proposed constitutional amendments. Nearly all of these studies dealt with ballot
measures for specific subjects rather than with proposals for comprehensive revision
of the Constitution. In 1960 the City Club membership approved a report on the
amendment which permits the legislature to revise the Constitution and refer it
to the people. The report pointed out that over-all revision of the ecntury-old,
much-amended Constitution was desirable in order to make it "more concise, logical,
understandable, and up to date."
Some of the main goals of state government reorganization could very likely be
achieved through legislative action. But many analysts of state government believe
legislative action alone cannot achieve the strengthening and revitalization which
state governments must have. As the federal Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations reported in 1955, in many states it is an antiquated constitution which
has seriously hindered the adaptability and effectiveness of state and local govern-
ment:
The Commission finds a very real and pressing need for the states to improve
their constitutions. A number of states recently have taken energetic action
to rewrite outmoded charters. In these states this action has been regarded as
a first step in the program to achieve the flexibility required to meet the
modern needs of their citizens.
Authorities on American government, from James Brycc's time to today, have
agreed on the need for revision. Of the many criticisms of state constitutions, the
most common are that they are often far too long, cluttered with excessive detail,
duplications, inconsistencies, and obsolete provisions, and marred by the presence
of much material which is properly statutory in nature, rather than constitutional.
In some cases, hundreds of amendments have frozen into the fundamental law
specific provisions dear to special interests.
Many state constitutions, designed more than a century ago for rural agrarian
societies where the demands upon, and responsibilities of, government were few,
have perpetuated a system in which executive power is highly fragmented among
a maze of executive agencies, so that the authority of the Governor is glaringly
unequal to his responsibilities. Similarly, the capacity of the legislature to cope with
the needs of a modern society is often severely restricted by a limitation to biennial
sessions, and by detailed constitutional limitations on taxation, borrowing and
expenditure. In some state constitutions, outmoded legislative apportionment
provisions have carried into an increasingly urbanized, industrialized, metropolitan
society a pattern of rural dominance which reflects the realities of the last century
but not of today. Commenting upon these weaknesses, the Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations reported that "many State constitutions restrict the scope,
effectiveness and adaptability of State and local action. These self-imposed consti-
tutional limitations . . . have frequently been the underlying cause of State and
Municipal pleas for Federal assistance."
Many of the criticisms which students of state government have made of state
constitutions and state governments in general have also been made of Oregon's
constitutional and governmental structure. Among them are these:
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(1) The Constitution is excessively long and complex.
The Constitution is too long, too complex, and too difficult to understand.
It has been amended a hundred and fifteen times. Some of its provisions arc
obsolete, such as those prohibiting titles of nobility (Art. I, Sec. 29), penalizing
dueling (Art. II, Sec. 9), providing that the Governor shall be superintendent
of public instruction unless otherwise provided by law (Art. VIII, Sec. 1),
prohibiting the legislative chartering of banks and the issuance or circulation
by banks of checks or promissory notes (Art. II, Sec. 1), and providing fixed
salaries for the Governor (SI,500), the Secretary of State (SI,500), Treasurer
($800) and Supreme Court judges ($2,000). In addition, there is the confusing
presence of two Seventh Articles; one designated "Amended" and the other
"Original." A minor criticism is the presence of numerous and disconcerting
misspellings: "Cheif executive," "Govenor," "Religeon," "Suprume Court,"
"greviances," etc.
(2) The Constitution contains many provisions which should be statutory, not
constitutional.
The Constitution contains main provisions which properly should be
matters for legislative decision and ought not to be frozen into the constitutional
document or given constitutional stature. Among these are the provision for
the sale of liquor by the glass (Art. I, Sec. 39), the naming of county officers
and specification of their method of selection and terms of office (Art. VI,
Sec. 6), the detailed provision of judicial procedures on appeals (Art. VII,
Amended, Sec. 3), the provision that all "stationary" required for State use
shall be supplied by the lowest bidder (Art. IX, Sec. 9), and the provision
providing for qualifications of the state printer (Art. XII, Sec. 1).
(3) Executive Power is too diffused.
The Governor is in an undesirably weak position. He is charged with
responsibility for effective operation of the executive branch, but his authority
is not commensurate with that responsibility.
As Governor Hatfield noted in his 1960 recommendations for improve-
ments in the executive branch, the Governor shares control of executive func-
tions with five other elected officials, and at least 89 boards, commissions,
authorities and committees having rule-making, advisory or managerial roles,
with over 50 agencies reporting directly to the Governor. Emphasizing that
this complicated organization of the executive branch constitutes "a massive
obstacle to efficient, responsible, and responsive government," Governor Hat-
field summarized the problems in these words:
1. A multitude of administrative units, each so independent of the other as
to make certain that coordination and efficiency will be at a minimum.
2. Responsibility and authority so subdivided that action is inevitably slower
and less adequate than it ought to be.
3. The assignment of executive responsibility to other elected officials, leaving
the Governor with responsibility for actions he cannot control.
4. The indiscriminate assignment to boards and commissions of final admini-
strative authority, making the government less responsive to the decisions
of the people and more responsive to special interests than it ought to be,
and further accentuating the division of responsibility and the difficulty of
coordination.
5. An organizational structure so complex that it is nearly impossible for any
Governor to provide executive leadership or control.
(4) There is no independent post-audit.
There is no provision for an independent post-audit and review of state
financial transactions by an official responsible to the legislature. This function
is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the financial and accounting
controls exercised bv the executive branch.
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(5) Annual legislative sessions are needed.
The complex and continuing nature of legislative problems, particularly
those relating to budgeting, has led many legislators, executive officials and
students of government to believe that annual legislative sessions are desirable.
The Oregon Constitution provides for regular sessions only every other year.
(6) Taxing power is inflexibly restricted.
Detailed constitutional restrictions on the state's power to tax, borrow, and
spend are regarded by many authorities as unnecessary limitations on the
legislature's capacity to make the flexible decisions needed to meet changing
needs. Yet the Oregon Constitution specifically earmarks the very large revenues
from motor fuel taxes and vehicle licenses for highway and recreational
purposes. Another frequently criticized provision is the six per cent limitation
on annual increases in budgets of taxing districts. Some critics oppose this
restriction as one which hampers needed flexibility, others have regarded it
as an ineffective restriction which serves as a kind of license to increase spending
by six per cent every year.
In addition, the Constitution (Art. XI, Sec. 7) contains a specific limitation
of $50,000 upon state debt. Bonding programs to exceed this limitation can be
effectuated only through constitutional amendments. Although approving the
general principle of constitutional debt limitations, many observers question
the wisdom of requiring a constitutional amendment for programs in excess of
the debt limit. The same end could be achieved by a constitutional provision
requiring a favorable vote of the people in a statewide referendum in order to
exceed the debt limitation, thus obviating the necessity for an amendment.
(7) The Constitution may be amended too easily.
The fact that the Constitution has been amended well over a hundred
times since 1902 has convinced many people that it can be amended too
easily. The present provision allows amendments to be proposed by a simple
majority of the membership of both houses of the legislature and requires
approval by a majority of the voters. An alternative mode of amendment is
through initiative petition signed by a number of people equal to ten per cent
of those who voted in the last Supreme Court election and approval by a
majority of the voters.
(8) The judicial system is not unified.
Some analysts believe that our judicial system suffers from lack of unity
and that the constitutional establishment of specific courts prevents needed
flexibility. They suggest that the Constitution should be amended to allow the
legislature to create an integrated state judicial system under the supervisory
authority of the Supreme Court.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THE LEGISLATURE
By the early 195O's, some individuals and organizations had become convinced
that Oregon needed substantial constitutional reform. At that time only three routes
were open: a constitutional convention (which could probably not be called by the
initiative process); individual amendments referred by the legislature; and amend-
ment by initiative. (In 1964 the Supreme Court held that a completely revised
document could not be proposed by the initiative: Holmes v. Appling, 237 Or 546.)
In 1953 a Governor's and Legislative Constitutional Commission was appointed
and reported unanimously in 1955 that the Constitution needed at least extensive
revision. A majority favored a constitutional convention.
Legislation for a referendum on the calling of a convention was unsuccessfully
proposed several times during the decade, but the 1959 Legislature did refer to
the voters an amendment (the so-called "gateway amendment") which would allow
the legislature by a two-thirds vote of each house to propose as one ballot measure
a revision of any part or all of the Constitution. In 1960 this amendment (which
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was an addition to other methods) was adopted by a vote of 358,367 to 299,895.
Its adoption must be credited largely to the League of Women Voters which has
long spearheaded the fight for constitutional revision.
The 1961 Legislature could have constituted itself as a constitutional conven-
tion but it chose instead to pass Senate Joint Resolution 20 creating a Constitutional
Revision Commission. The preamble of the resolution pointed out that "parts of the
Constitution of Oregon have become obsolete during the century since its adoption";
"many conflicts and ambiguities have been created by scores of amendments in that
time"; and "Oregon cannot adequately reflect its Twentieth Century attitudes in
the framework of a Nineteenth Century Constitution."
A seventeen-member Commission was appointed: seven by the Speaker of the
House, six by the President of the Senate, two by the Governor, and two by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Commission made its report on December
15, 1962, under the title: "A New Constitution for Oregon." According to the
report (p. 31):
The revised Constitution recommended with this report does not favor one
branch over any other, it is unpartisan as between political parties or factions,
and it holds no advantage for any economic or geographic bloc. The only place
it is not neutral is in the field of individual rights and civil liberties; it is on
the side of the individual.
Further, in its changes from present practice the Revised Constitution does not
deprive any political, economic or social group of any right, privilege or possible
advantage which that group may have under the existing Constitution.
This is as it should be. A Constitution should provide a balance between
contending elements. It should lay down visible, simple rules for government—•
rules which permit people to govern themselves in such a way as to meet their
needs, present and future.
The Revised Constitution offers an improved framework for effective, demo-
cratic self-government. And it clears away old constitutional debris which raises
areas of doubt in government, in law and individual rights.
The Commission felt that its document had these characteristics:
(1) It would improve the ability of the state government to solve modern
problems by provision of an adequate governmental structure.
(2) It would secure and protect individual liberties.
(3) It would define the power of government while achieving flexibility.
(4) It would provide for three relatively strong branches of government with
checks and balances between them, but without internal impediments to effective-
ness.
(5) It would be simple and straightforward.
(6) It would preserve the basic traditions of Oregon government.
The most important general characteristic was that it was not merely a cleaned-
up revision but a new Constitution.
The essentials of the document can be summarized as follows:
(1) The Governor would be the only statewide elective executive official.
(2) Other than that imposed by legislative authority, the most important check
on the executive would be in the office of the Controller. This officer would be
selected as provided by law for at least an eight-year term during which he would
be ineligible to be a candidate for any other office. He would perform the post-audit
function and any other non-executive functions given him.
(3) Administration of state government would be gathered into not more than
20 major departments. The Governor would have the power of appointment (with
Senate approval) and removal of the department heads; effectuation of the re-
organization would be a legislative responsibility.
(4) The bicameral legislature would be preserved, and apportionment would
be based on a standard under which no member of a house could represent more
than two times as many people as any other member.
216 P O R T L A N D C I T Y C L U B B U L L E T I N
(5) Each house of the legislature would have an odd number of members and
the Senate could not have more than half the membership of the House.
(6) The legislature would meet annually without limitation as to subject matter
or length of sessions.
(7) A unified court system headed by a seven-member Supreme Court would
embrace all but municipal courts.
(8) The Governor would appoint all judges in the first instance. Judicial elec-
tions would consist only of answering the question whether an appointed judge
should continue to serve. If a judge were rejected, the Governor would make a new
appointment.
(9) A State Law Commission would be established to advise the Governor on
judicial appointments, advise the Supreme Court on rules, and advise the legis-
lature on revision of statutes.
(10) The Supreme Court would have the power to make rules for judicial
procedure, subject to legislative rejection or change.
(11) Functions of the grand jury would be left to legislative definition.
(12) The judiciary could review legislation for substantive as well as procedural
process.
(13) Various changes would be made in the Bill of Rights, including elimi-
nation of some archaisms, clarification of the double jeopardy clause, broadening
of rights of those accused of crime, and provision of increased flexibility in condem-
nation procedures.
(14) Prohibition of state debt would be retained, but authorization for specific
debt exceptions would depend upon a popular vote in each instance instead of
upon constitutional amendment.
(15 The six per cent limitation would be retained.
(16) Revenues from motor fuel taxes and vehicle licenses would continue
to be earmarked.
(17) The base for determining the necessary signatures for a referral or
initiative would be the total votes cast for Governor at the preceding general election.
The percentages required would be raised slightly.
(18) The emergency clause on revenue measures would still be prohibited.
(19) Local government provisions would be largely unchanged, except that
the prohibition against lending money or credit to corporations was made subject
to legislative exception. Methods of altering subdivision boundaries or merging
and dissolving subdivisions would be left to law; and provision would be made for
creating metropolitan districts.
(20) A constitutional convention could be initiated by the people.
(21) Individual constitutional amendments would have to pass each house by
a two-thirds majority vote before being submitted to the people.
(22) Numerous provisions of the present Constitution which the Commission
thought should be statutory would be compiled in Oregon Revised Statutes and
would no longer be part of the Constitution. Included were capital punishment
and details of the recall, existing bond programs and powers exercisable by Peoples'
Utility Districts.
The Commission adopted its report with only two dissents. One dissenter took
principal exception to the apportionment provisions; permissive legislation district-
ing; annual sessions; establishment of a cabinet form of government; elimination of
elective executive officers; Controller; Supreme Court rule-making power; the
method of judicial selection; establishment of a law commission; downgrading of
the grand jury; and enhancement of the power of the Supreme Court. The other
dissenter limited his written objections to the judiciary article, although expressing
broader disagreement with the document. He objected to freezing the Supreme
Court's membership at seven, to the mechanism of judicial selection, establishment
of the law commission, the rule-making power and the grand jury limitations. There-
were other exceptions to particular provisions. Seven members dissented from the
substantive due process provision. Two members suggested a possible alternative
to the single executive scheme, under which a Secretary of State would be elected
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on the same ticket with the Governor and perform duties delegated to him by the
Governor, including, if the Governor wished, heading a department. He would
also be first in the line of succession to the governorship.
The Commission's revised Constitution was introduced in the 1963 Legislature
as House Joint Resolution 1. It was referred in the House to a Committee on
Constitutional Revision, headed by Representative (now Congressman) John R.
Dcllcnback. Extensive hearings were held and the Committee reported it out with
amendments and it passed the House by a 41-19 vote. In the Senate a eontroversv
developed over the legislative apportionment provision written into HJR 1 by a
majority of the Senate Constitutional Revision committee. Despite several attempts,
the Senate was unable to muster the necessary two-thirds majority for any appor-
tionment formula, and the measure died.
It should not be thought that opposition to the Commission's proposal was
muted. To a large extent the document embodied the objectives and resembled in
detail the proposals of the League of Women Voters, but the League was the only
group that strongly supported the revision. The Oregon State Grange, for example,
opposed the report for several reasons, including a lack of conviction that so
substantial a revision was needed or desirable, and opposition to reduction of the
number of elected officials. In addition, that organization saw a danger to public-
power in the elimination from the Constitution of detailed provisions for Peoples'
Utility Districts. The Oregon Farm Bureau Federation (as well as the Grange)
opposed submission of a one-package revision, favoring instead submission of a
series of separate amendments. Organi/ed labor opposed it for reasons which
included the elimination of several elected officials, particularly the Labor Com-
missioner. Committees of the Oregon State and Multnomah Bar Associations
studied the Commission's proposals, particularly those relating to the judiciary,
which they in large measure disapproved. The Oregon State Bar at its 1962 annual
meeting disapproved of several provisions including the judicial selection provisions,
rule-making power, Supreme Court jurisdiction, and the Law Commission, and
proposed that the whole question of constitutional revision be put over until 1965
for further study. Reaction of some elective officials whose positions would be
made appointive was also unfavorable.
There was little organized support for the Commission's report and considerable
opposition outside the Legislature. Moreover, Governor Hatfield did not take a
direct, active role. He strongly favored substantial constitutional reform, a position
which dated back to his service in the legislature, when he, Richard L. Neuberger,
Robert D. Holmes and other legislators were active in trying to bring about a
constitutional convention. Nevertheless, consistent with his philosophy that the
Governor should not interject himself into the legislative process, he did not attempt
to apply the strength of his position to the achievement of a new Constitution.
After the 1963 Legislature, a group called the "Citizens' Committee for
Revision of the Oregon Constitution" attempted to bring about the submission of a
Constitution by the initiative process. It's proposed document reflected the Com-
mission's report and the work of the 1963 Legislature. Additionally, the executive
article was changed to provide for a Secretary of State elected jointly with the
Governor to perform functions delegated to him by the Governor (an alternative
suggested by two members of the Commission). The attempt to place the proposal
on the ballot resulted in litigation terminating in a decision by the Oregon Supreme
Court that an entire Constitution could not be initiated (see p. 214 above).
In the 1965 Legislature, the performance of the Llouse reflected its continuing
belief not onlv that constitutional reform was desirable and necessary but that the
1960 amendment constituted a mandate to produce and submit to the people a
new Constitution. Under the leadership of Speaker Montgomery and Representative
Dellenback, the House approved a document and sent it to the Senate. HJR 1 in
the 1965 session, as approved bv the Llouse, differed from the Commission's report
in the following important particulars:
(1) It set the number of senators at 30 and the number of representatives at
60. The Commission report had merely called for an odd number of members in
each house with Senate membership to be not less than one-third or more than
one-half the number in the House.
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(2) A formula for determining legislative apportionment was contained in the
House measure. The Commission report had only set guidelines for use in
determining apportionment.
(3) It contained a provision, not found in the Commission report but approved
by the voters as an amendment to the present Constitution, allowing persons
employed by the State Board of Higher Education, and members or employees
of school boards, to be members of the Legislature.
(4) Several sections of the Commission version pertaining to the judiciary
were not a part of HJR 1. It did not provide for judicial review of legislation for
substantive due process, rule-making power in the Supreme Court, or a State Law
Commission. In addition, the House revision provided for the initial election of
judges and for their running against live opponents in subsequent elections. It also
required use of the grand jury system and delineated grand jury functions in the
Constitution itself.
(5) The Controller would be elected rather than "selected."
More significant than these differences were the major areas in which HJR 1
was the same, or basically the same, as the Commission report. These included:
(1) Making the Governor the only statewide elective executive official.
(2) Reorganization of the administration of state government into not more
than twenty departments.
(3) Creation of the Office of Controller.
(4) Retention of the six per cent tax limitation.
(5) Provision for annual sessions of the legislature. (While required in the
Commission version, HJR 1 stated regular sessions "may be held" in even-numbered
years as well as in the required odd-numbered years.)
(6) Making the total number of votes cast for Governor in the preceding
general election the base for determining how many signatures would be required
for a referral or initiative. (The two versions vary in one instance in that the
Commission report sets the figure at eight per cent for initiative petitions, and HJR 1
set it at ten per cent.)
Another version of a revised Constitution, Senate Joint Resolution 11, was
introduced in the Senate early in the 1965 session by Senators Mahoney and Yturri.
This document differed in several major respects from both the Commission report
and HJR 1; it was onlv a cleaned-up version of the present Constitution with few
substantive changes. The Senate defeated SJR 11 bv a vote of 21 to 8. However,
several of its important features, as well as other different provisions, were incor-
porated into HJR 1 by the Senate Committee. The version of HJR 1 finally voted
on by the Senate contained these features:
(1) Allowed statutory restrictions requiring that a person be an owner of real
property in order to vote in certain types of elections.
(2) Increased the percentage figure—and consequently the number of signa-
tures needed—on petitions for an initiative or referendum.
(3) Set maximum membership figures for the legislature at 35 in the Senate
and 65 in the House.
(4) Contained a different apportionment system.
(5) Stated legislative sessions would be held biennially, with no provision for
regular annual sessions.
(6) Did not make it mandatory for justices of the peace or judges of county
courts having judicial functions to be attorneys.
(7) Contained no provision for a Controller.
(8) Retained the Secretary of State and the State Treasurer as constitutional
executive officers to be elected on a statewide basis.
(9) Dropped the six per cent tax limitation.
(10) Required a 60 per cent favorable vote to pass a measure incurring bonded
indebtedness for the state or a city, county or public corporation.
The Senate's revised version of HJR 1 passed that house by a vote of 22 to 7.
The House refused to concur in the amendments put in by the Senate. Three
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successive joint committees, each consisting of two members of each legislative
body met, but were unable to come to agreement. A fourth such committee had
been formed when the legislature adjourned.
This Committee recognizes that there were numerous areas for substantial
disagreement with the 1965 House version, and that there were serious-minded
Senators who doubted the desirability of a substantial constitutional revision.
However, the overriding reason why no action was forthcoming in 1965 was that the
leadership of the Senate was determined that a revised Constitution not be sub-
mitted to the people. The House-passed measure was directed to a Senate committee
specially constituted with a membership that was opposed to it. It was significantlv
changed in committee to eliminate many of the important provisions the House had
approved. Conference committee members from the Senate were apparently in-
structed not to accept compromises which could have produced a revision. The
process was one the Committee repeatedly heard described as "game playing,"
which is to say that those in control of the Senate were merely going through the
motions with no intention that a revised Constitution be approved. They prevailed.
VI. THE PRESENT SITUATION:
ISSUES AND PRELIMINARY JUDGMENTS
Six years and two sessions of the legislature have passed since the people
empowered the legislature to submit to them a revised Constitution. The legislature
is again considering the problem in 1967.
It would be a relatively easy task to draft a Constitution for Oregon that would
satisfy political scientists and meet most theoretical standards for the best form of
state government. However, it would not have any chance to pass the legislature or
to be approved by the people. Furthermore, it probably would not even be desirable,
for it would necessarilv be unrealistic in view of Oregon's history and tradition. Be
that as it may, no one has proposed that Oregon scrap history and tradition and start
afresh. Every serious form of revision put forth has built on past experience and
the pressing needs of today and tomorrow, recognizing that what the people would
be asked to adopt as their fundamental law must be adequate for the long run.
If the present efforts produce an acceptable document, substantial constitu-
tional revision is not likely to be undertaken again for a long time.
HJR 1 from the 1965 session, possibly in a somewhat modified form, probably
will be reintroduced in the House. Unless there have been substantial changes
either in the makeup of the House or in the thinking of the members, it is probable
that the House in due course will approve something verv like that document.
Governor McCall intends to put before the legislature a form of constitutional
revision as part of his program."1 In the Senate its 1965 version of HJR 1 has
been introduced as SJR 7 (with some changes to reflect a 1966 amendment to the
present Constitution and to restore the six per cent limitation), apparentlv, to judge
by previous actions of the Senate leadership, in hope and confidence that it will
not be passed. It is evident that "game playing" will continue and that meaningful
constitutional revision will again face very serious obstacles in the Senate.
The Commission's proposal contained much that has since dropped by the
wayside and is not likely to be revived. Most important of these provisions were
those which related to substantive due process, the so-called Missouri plan for
judicial selection and tenure, rule-making power in the Supreme Court, and down-
grading of the grand jury. With the exception of substantive due process, the
Committee believes that there was substantial merit in each of these proposals.
None of them, however, was fundamental, and their absence from the final product
should not be considered serious.
Other elements of the Commission's document are apparently not subject to
serious controversy. Some represent nothing more than cleaned-up forms of
present provisions; others are language changes without substantive effect. With
the exception of the grand jury provisions and the removal of the details of Peoples'
(i)Since this report was written, SJR 7 has been introduced at the request of the Governor.
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Utility District establishment and administration, the Committee heard no
objection to placing many former constitutional details in the category of statutes
subject to legislative power. A caveat should be entered here, however. The impli-
cations for public power of what was proposed with respect to PUD's were not
seen by the Committee until a witness pointed out that the proposal would subject
that form of public power to the mercy of the legislature. It is conceivable that
the detailed provisions making statutes of former constitutional provisions contain
similarly far-reaching implications not apparent to the Committee. Furthermore,
since capital punishment has only recently been abolished by vote of the people,
it would appear desirable that the legislature not have the power to reinstate it.
Office of Controller
The proposal for the establishment of the office of Controller is of very
great significance, not only because it would separate post-audit and admini-
stration, but because the office is intended to function as a general watchdog
over the functioning of the state government. This would certainly be an
innovation and one the Committee finds highly desirable, particularly in its
post-audit aspects. It might reasonably be expected that so important a change
would draw serious opposition, but the Committee heard none. Instead, there was
nearly unanimous approval for the idea.
Executive Branch Reorganization
Despite the fact that executive reorganization has had an uneven and largely
disappointing course, one of the major proposals of the Commission which has
survived to date calls for consolidation of administrative agencies into not more
than 20 major departments according to function. Most objections to this idea
centered on the premise that it would mean the establishment of a cabinet system,
which historically has been a subject of controversy in Oregon. The Committee
believes that this objection is misconceived and mistaken. There is absolutely
nothing in the language to suggest that a cabinet system was intended, if by a
cabinet is meant a body charged collectively and formally with advising the chief
executive on policy. The overriding purpose is to bring about a rationalization of
the chaotic conditions created bv the existence of multitudinous administrative
and advisory bodies which are appointed by the Governor but not responsible to him.
It is based on the belief that efficient execution of the laws demand that there be
clear lines of authority. Few witnesses opposed this consolidation provision.
The Committee is unanimously agreed that the objective of the provision is
fundamental to significant revision, but there are serious questions about the
mechanics for implementation. A general directive is stated but actual reorgani-
zation is left to the legislature without providing any insurance that the legislature
must actually perform. In view of the history of reorganization efforts in the
Oregon legislature, it is the Committee's belief that the purpose of the provision
should be retained in language that would make sure it would be achieved.
Furthermore, as written, it is vaguely worded and ambiguous and could breed
much litigation. It should be strengthened by more precise language.
Legislative Apportionment
Legislative apportionment was one of the most serious issues in the 1963 and
1965 sessions, as it had been in the Commission's deliberations and in the proposals
of the Citizens' Committee. It killed HJR 1 in the 1963 Legislature. What looked
like disagreement in the previous sessions about the details of how to provide
for periodic reapportionment was in fact a fight over the "one man, one vote"
principle. There are individuals and groups for whom reapportionment is still
an issue, at least in the sense that they do not like the "one man, one vote"
rule imposed by United States Supreme Court rulings. That fight should now
be forgotten, for there can be no doubt that the principle is now a part of the
United States Constitution. It should not prove an insuperable, or for that matter
even very difficult, task for the legislature to approve a formula that will satisfy the
principle, especially in view of the fact that any variation from it in a new Consti-
tution will only invite the federal Courts to rewrite that part of the document.
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Reduction in the Number of Elected Officials
The proper nature and scope of executive power is the major area of controversy
standing in the way of submission of a new constitution to the people. Any strength-
ening of the authority and responsibility of the executive branch would represent
a major and significant change in Oregon's governmental system, which has been
characterized since the beginning by a large number of elected officers sharing a
diffuse and essentially weak executive power. Judged against this background the
change proposed by the Commission was radical, for it would have established the
Governor as the only statewide elective executive officer, and would have vested
in him the entire executive power.
The Committee is convinced that the Commission's proposal for a single
elected executive is politically unacceptable either at the legislative or the
popular level, however sound it might be theoretically. The recent effort to
remove the Superintendent of Public Instruction as an elective office is persuasive
evidence that the people of Oregon are resistant to reduction in the number of
elected officials.
Several witnesses before the Committee expressed strong opposition to the
idea of a single elected statewide executive official, while at the same time they
recognized the desirability of a stronger Governor with more administrative
authority. Much criticism of the present situation is based on the frequent use of
a statewide elective office as a base from which to launch a campaign for the
governorship. Whenever this circumstance leads to open conflict of views or a lack
of cooperation within the executive branch, it can be expected to have a deleterious
effect on state government. However, the real problem is not competition for office.
The real problem is diffusion of executive authority. That can only be ended
by elimination of the present system under which other officials, elective or
appointive, exercise, independently of the Governor, power and authority which
should rest in the Governor. The Committee has been led to acceptance of
this important distinction: It is not vitally important that only one executive
branch official be elected. It is vitally important that Oregon end diffusion of
executive power and the resulting weakness of that power.
The indications are that the right of the people to elect statewide executive
branch officials must be respected in any new Constitution which the voters still
can reasonably be expected to approve. The Committee has heard several alternative
proposals which their backers believe would be acceptable to the voters.(2)
(1) A Governor and a Secretary of State who would function as Controller;
(2) A Governor and a Secretary of State who would function as Lieutenant
Governor;
(3) A Governor, Secretary of State, and Treasurer, just as at present (as well
as all other elected officials).
(4) A Governor and a Lieutenant Governor who would perform functions
assigned to him by the Governor.
Proposals 1, 2 and 4 assume that the officers would run and be elected on the
same ticket, as a team.
One member of the Commission who has been in the forefront of the revision
effort told the Committee that he would actively oppose any constitution which
abandons the single elected executive concept. Several other witnesses strongly
supported the idea as proposed by the Commission, but they recognized that
elimination of all but one elected statewide official would probably cause the defeat
of the entire revision. The Committee believes that a reduction in the present
number of elected officials is desirable, but election of two or more statewide
officials is not necessarily inconsistent with needed improvement in the
constitutional status of the Governor and the executive branch, so long as the
powers and duties of the other offices are such as not to conflict with having
the executive power rest in the Governor. Unless there is presented to the
people a chance to bring about reorganization of the administration of state
(2)The proposed independent office of Controller, which is not to be an executive office, is not
included in the question of the nature and power of the executive branch.
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government under an effective executive, little is likely to be gained by
constitutional revision.
There are parts of the present Constitution which no proposal so far has sought
to change or which have received inadequate attention. The Committee is not
prepared to recommend that these necessarily be changed, but it should be recog-
nized that they represent problems worthy of consideration. The major ones are
as follows:
(1) Lieutenant Governor
The Committee is impressed with the desirability of having a Lieutenant
Governor elected on the same ticket with the Governor. Not only would he be
first in the line of gubernatorial succession, but he could be assigned to perform
a number of functions, including:
a. Hearing petitions and complaints
b. Serving for the Governor ex officio on boards and commissions
c. Handling extradition matters
d. Performing ceremonial functions
e. Inspecting state institutions
In general his duties would serve to relieve the Governor of much time-consuming
detail. He should not preside over the Senate.
(2) Gubernatorial Succession
At present, if a Governor dies in office, or even if he leaves the state temporarily,
the President of the Senate succeeds to the office. Although the matter is not without
argument on each side, the Committee believes that it would be more desirable that
the line of succession run first, at least, to an officer elected on a statewide basis,
rather than to a legislator who may represent a small constituency. In any event, in
modern times, there is no reason why the Governor should not be Governor at all
times, even if he might temporarily be outside the state's borders and even if there
were a Lieutenant Governor.
(3) Annual Legislative Sessions
It is unlikely that this state can much longer get by with biennial sessions of its
legislature. The problems of budgeting for periods of 30 or more months in this
rapidly changing world, with ever-increasing demands on government, have become
so severe as to be almost insuperable. The 1965 revision passed by the House
permitted annual sessions. The Committee is convinced that a very strong case
exists right now for required annual sessions, even if every other session is limited
to budgetary concerns. It has also been suggested that continual sessions may in
fact be the most efficient way to meet the problem.
(4) Unicameral Legislature
The traditional bicameral legislature has lost some of its reason for existence
since the establishment of the "one man, one vote" rule. It is possible to achieve
sufficient guarantees against hasty legislation in a unicameral system, and perhaps
the time has come to give serious consideration to adopting it.
(5) Emergency Clause
At present the emergency clause (which permits legislation to become effective
immediately upon its enactment) cannot be attached to a revenue measure. This
has an undesirable hamstringing effect on revenue planning and should be elimi-
nated. Nonetheless, the Committee recognizes that elimination is of questionable
political practicability, regardless of its merit.
(6) Six Per Cent Limitation
The so-called six per cent tax limitation is in fact probably as much a license
as a limitation. Every witness who discussed it favored its elimination. If a Con-
stitution can be drafted that is otherwise politically acceptable, it seems likely that
elimination of this provision will not prevent its approval, even though it may be
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necessary to substitute a meaningful limitation on the power of taxing bodies to
increase their tax revenues.
(7) Real Property Tax Limitation
Since the 1965 session of the legislature, the question of limiting real property
taxes has reached the level of a political crisis. A major problem facing the 1967
Legislature is to design a tax program which will assure the continuation of state
and local government services and at the same time allow enough property tax
relief to quiet the very strong popular demand for a stringent restriction on the
rate of real property taxation. No proposed constitutional revision so far has
contained any such restriction, and the Committee does not favor one. It must be
recognized, however, that unless there is a legislative solution to the tax
problem, a Constitution which does not provide for some real property tax
limitation will meet very stiff opposition, regardless of how meritorious might
be its other aspects.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The movement for constitutional revision in Oregon (as elsewhere) is con-
cerned with meeting effectively the urgent governmental needs of new times and
conditions while continuing to secure and protect the basic rights and privileges
of the people. The motivation and thrust of the revision effort are progressive
with respect to the administration of affairs of government and are conservative
where the rights of the individual are concerned. The principles, rooted in the
evolution of human rights, constitutionalism and the American system of govern-
ment that are the expressed concern of many Oregonians (and others throughout
the land) have not been ignored in the movement. Not to be controverted by
revision are the concepts of liberty, personal rights, public will and popular
sovereignty adopted by our Founding Fathers. These principles would be
strengthened through reiteration and reemphasis in a shorter and more funda-
mental constitutional document freed from the clutter and encumbrance of
more detailed, more contemporary and shifting law.
The movement holds no threat to the essentials of the concept of checks and
balances or to the federal system. The traditional balances between the major
branches would remain intact—protecting the executive and the legislative from
domination by the other, and the executive and the judiciary from special interests
on transitory mass opinion. The purpose is to restore and reinforce the role of the
state in the federal system. A modern, dynamic, cooperative and effective American
federalism is widely sought by leaders in political thought. Obtaining it necessarily
means strengthening state government and its role in the system, with restraints
upon centralized power, with broadened opportunity for participation by the citizens
and with better adaptation of governmental policies and programs to the needs of
geographical areas.
Enhancement of the qualities of responsiveness and responsibility in state
government is a major goal with respect to the rights and needs of all of the people
—of the "invisible community" including "those who are living, those who are
dead, and those who are to be born" (Edmund Burke). Oregon's constitutional
revision movement seeks this reenforcement of democratic government through an
executive elected by and accountable to the people and dedicated to the general
public interest and the administration of the law; a representative legislature
responsible and responsive to separate constituencies as well as to statewide interest;
a judiciary strengthened in its role of protecting rights and administering justice;
and, over all, a general government better equipped to meet, cooperatively and
effectively, the needs of the people, the economy, and the environment under
conditions of rapidly increasing complexity and urgency.
The Committee believes that this is the opportune time to bring about the
needed revisions, for the following reasons:
1. The voters of the state have given a clear mandate for the drafting of a
revised Constitution for submission to them for approval or rejection. A blue-ribbon
Commission on Constitutional Revision, after exhaustive study, has proposed such
a draft. The legislature has considered that proposal in depth, through hearings,
debate and conference, over two biennia. Governors of the past have favored
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meaningful revision. Governor McCall has said to this Committee, to the public
and to the legislature that his administration is strongly committed to obtaining
a new Constitution. Nonpartisan citizen interest is evident in a number of quarters.
General public interest may be assumed on the basis of the revision enabling
measure. A proposal not in conflict with Oregon's history, traditions and attitudes
should have fair consideration at the polls.
2. There is a serious and mounting crisis in state and intergovernmental
affairs. It is not an emergency of sudden and dramatic impact obvious to everybody,
but one in which threats to the economy, environment and human well-being have
been building up on a wide front over a period of years. Needed to cope with the
situation are much greater governmental flexibility, sureness, quickness and effec-
tiveness in appraisal, decision-making and program formation. This crisis has many
facets, but two concrete and vital problems may be cited to illustrate its urgent
nature: first, the control of accelerating pollution of our air, water and land; and,
second, protection and rehabilitation of our urban, metropolitan, and rural environ-
ments under the pressures of expansion and change.
3. The State of Oregon should not continue to shrink from enlarging its role
in the solution of the critical problems of an increasingly complex state community
and federal svstem. If federal government control of local affairs is not to be
expanded vastly bevond its already extensive scope, Oregon (as well as other states)
must now accept the problem challenges which can be met at the state level with
well-organized and vigorously led state government. Governor Rockefeller of New
York spoke directly of the need for preserving
. . . the vitally important balance between state and national sovereignty
within a federal system. To hold this vital balance, all of the states them-
selves must fully awaken to—and act on—their responsibilities and
opportunities . . . For if the states ignore or evade their responsibility to
act in these areas, there will be no alternative to direct federal-local action.
If state inaction creates a vacuum, the federal government, under the
pressure of public opinion, will fill it. (The Future of Federalism)
The Committee agrees.
It is to be hoped that the obstacles in the way of constitutional revision which
exist in the legislative process, and which this report delineates, can be overcome in
this session and that a document will be referred to the voters. If that does happen,
however, popular approval of a revised Constitution will require earnest effort under
vigorous leadership. In this campaign, the role of the Governor will be vital and is
most likely to be the key to success. Governor McCall has given the strongest
indications that he fully intends to fill this role. It is certain, though, that he
cannot do the job alone. It will require cooperation by individuals, organizations,
business and government, and a well-financed drive to persuade the voters
that what Oregon has is not adequate and that what is proposed is both neces-
sary and desirable. Whether the effort should be made depends entirely upon
whether the proposed document is worth it.
The Committee has not found it appropriate to attempt to reach hard and fast
conclusions on the specific contents of a new Constitution. What it has sought to
do is to suggest the problems that face state governments in general, and Oregon's
in particular, to outline a position in favor of substantial revision of the Commission,
to analyze the various proposals that have been made, and to make some tentative
judgments on those proposals.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
As this report is prepared, the Committee is not aware of all the specific
proposals that will be introduced in the legislature. What action the legislature will
eventually approve is even less certain. Therefore at this time the Committee limits
its recommendations to meaningful general suggestions and a proposal for further
study and report.
The Committee recommends:
(1) That the 1967 Legislative Assembly develop and refer to the people
a substantially revised Constitution that will provide a more responsive and
responsible structure of state government, encourage leadership and enable
the state more effectively to meet the needs of the citizens, foster the economy,
and protect the physical environment. That revision should include provisions
that will:
(a) Safeguard individual liberties;
(b) Increase legislative branch efficiency and fiscal control;
(c) End the diffusion of administrative responsibility by providing a more
departmentalized executive branch with effective responsibility and
control in the Governor;
(d) Provide a more unified judicial branch;
(e) Encourage cooperation and coordination between branches; and
(f) Express only the basic structure and limits of state government, leaving
sufficient flexibility to permit appropriately rapid response to changing
problems.
(2) That the Board of Governors authorize an appropriate committee to
observe, analyze and report on the progress of constitutional revision in the
1967 session of the legislature.
Respectfully submitted,
Roy F. Bessey
Kent E. Clark
Howard E. Dean
James W. Durham, Jr.
Frank H. Eiseman
Hugh McGilvra
Hardy Myers, Jr.
Francis A. Staten
George M. Joseph, Chairman
Approved by the Research Board January 30, 1967, and submitted to the Board of
Governors.
Received by the Board of Governors February 2, 1967 and ordered printed and submitted
to the membership for discussion and action on February 17, 1967.
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APPENDIX A
Summary of Executive Reorganization Proposals
1909-1912 Peoples Power League proposed transfer of functions of 46 boards
and commissions to seven departments headed by individuals ap-
pointed by the Governor. Only the Governor and the Auditor would
have remained on elective. Plan was to be effected by constitutional
amendment.
An initiative measure failed of sufficient signatures to place it before
the electorate.
An amendment for a unicameral legislature and proportional repre-
sentation did receive sufficient signatures but was rejected by the
voters in general election of 1912.
1913 State Board of Control, consisting of Governor, Treasurer, and
Secretary of State, was established through action of the legislature.
1917-1919 State reorganization proposals in 1917 Legislature were referred to
committee of seven businessmen for study. Report was made to the
1919 Legislature recommending consolidation of agencies into ten
executive departments, headed by gubernatorial appointees. Provision
was also made for a Lieutenant Governor.
None of recommendations was adopted by the legislature.
1923-1925 A number of proposals for reorganization, including consolidation
and departmentalization in cabinet form of executive branch, failed
in legislative assemblies.
1927-1930 Major effort at reorganization resulted in several measures which
failed in the 1927 Legislature. An interim study committee was
appointed in that year and reported to the 1929 session. A proposed
implementing amendment was defeated at the polls in November,
1930.
1929-1931 Some piecemeal departmentalization was effected: Departments of
Higher Education, Agriculture, State Police were created in 1931.
1933 Efforts to establish departmental organization with respect to
Business Regulation, Public Health and Welfare failed in 1933
Legislature. An interim committee was appointed to study organi-
zation problems.
1934-1937 Consolidation in slate government was an issue in 1934 guberna-
torial campaign. Governor Martin proposed to 1935 session compre-
hensive departmentalization of administrative functions under ap-
pointive power of the Governor. Legislature provided for interim
committee to study subject with cooperation of the State Planning
Board. Report proposed limited departmentalization, involving
Finance, Business Regulation, Conservation and Public Welfare.
However, 1937 Legislature did not enact enabling legislation.
1949-1951 legislative Interim Committee on State Government Reorganization
—so-called Oregon "little Hoover Commission"—created in 1949.
Report placed major emphasis on financial controls and central state
services, with a Department of Finance and Administration. The
1951 Legislature provided for establishment of the proposed
department.
1953-1955 Legislative interim committee study proposed creation of a Depart-
ment of Revenue. The 195 5 Legislature did not approve, but did
create a Department of Motor Vehicles.
1957-1959 Legislative Interim Committee on Government Reorganization
created by 195 7 Legislature reported to 1959 session on a number
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of reorganization proposals. A "step" or evolutionary approach
rather than comprehensive "one-shot" executive branch reorganiza-
tion was proposed. Recommendations included: continuing develop-
ment of organization plans for the executive branch; immediate
establishment of Departments of Natural Resources and of Revenue;
strengthening of Governor's staff; strengthening of fiscal manage-
ment; coordination of capital improvement programming; central
services for boards and commissions.
The report also recommended strengthening the legislature in some
respects. The report proposed implementation by executive order and
legislative action, avoided recommendations of actions that might
involve constitutional amendment.
The 1959 Legislature failed to enact implementing legislation except
as to the provision for a Legislative Fiscal Officer.
1959-1961 Reorganization study by "blue ribbon" Reorganization Advisory
Committee consisting of former Governors Charles A. Sprague
(chairman) and Robert D. Holmes (vice-chairman), Senate President
Walter J. Pearson; Senator Anthony Yturri, Representatives Robert
Elfstrom and W. O. Kelsay; former Labor Commissioner William
Kimsey; educators E. B. Lemon, William C. Jones and John M.
Swarthout; news commentator Tom McCall; businessmen John
Gray, Hillman Lueddemann, and Thomas Sandoz; rancher John
Day; and attorneys Robert T. Mautz and C. Girard Davidson.
The report, transmitted by Governor Hatfield to the 1961 Legislature,
sought executive policies and agencies responsive to the popular will
and proposed departmental grouping, together with strengthening of
the chief executive's staff for improved coordination and greater
efficiency. The executive branch reorganization proposals called for
a cabinet type organization with Departments of Labor, Commerce,
Social Services, Education, Public Safetv, Transportation and Utili-
ties, General Government Services, and Natural Resources. The plan
proposed implementation under legislative enactment; constitutional
amendment was not contemplated.
Only the Department of Commerce was established.
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APPENDIX B
City Club Studies relating to Constitutional Amendment and Revision
A number of City Club studies has had to do with proposed amendments to the
state Constitution. Nearly all of these resulted from the introduction of ballot
measures. With one exception, in 1960, all related to amendments dealing with
separate subjects, and not to multiple-subject or comprehensive revision.
All of the investigations are listed below for background information and
reference purposes. The exceptional study of 1960, relating to authority for the
legislature to propose revision, is commented upon at greater length.
Year Amendment Subject Committee Club Voters'
1
 Recdn. Action Action
1920 Ballot. Amendment to provide for longer terms
of office for county elective officers. Yes Yes Yes
1921 Ballot. Amendment to lengthen legislative
session and increase pay. Yes Yes No
1927 Ballot. Amendment to increase salaries of
legislators. Yes Yes No
192 7 Ballot. Amendment to permit Portland to
establish a metropolitan area. Yes Yes No
1928 Ballot. Amendment limiting authority of legis-
lature on bills voted on by people. No No No
1929 Committee on Government Simplification rec-
ommendation of amendments and to provide
for city-county consolidation and for county
home rule. — — —
1930 Ballot. Amendment for a cabinet form in State
government. Yes Yes No
1930 Ballot. Amendment to increase salaries of
legislators. Yes Yes No
1930 Ballot. Amendment to provide for filling va-
cancies in state legislature. No No Yes
1930 Ballot. Amendment to provide for a Lieu-
tenant Governor. No No No
1931 Review of Oregon Public Service Commission. — — —
1933 Ballot. Amendment to permit county manager
form of government. Yes Yes No
1936 Ballot. Amendment to increase salaries of legis-
lators, permit fixing by legislature. Yes No No
1938 Ballot. Amendment extending Governor's
time for veto. Yes Yes Yes
1938 Ballot. Amendment to increase salaries of
legislators. Yes Yes Yes
1940 Ballot. Amendment to increase salaries of
legislators. Yes Yes No
1940 Ballot. Amendment to eliminate restrictions on
terms of Secretary of State and State Treasurer. Yes No No
1942 Ballot. Amendment to increase salaries of
legislators. Yes Yes Yes
1944 Ballot. Amendment to permit county manager
form of government. Yes Yes Yes
1946 Ballot. Amendment to modify procedure in
bill reading. Yes Yes Yes
1946 Ballot. Amendment to increase number of
members in Senate. No No No
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Year
1946
Amendment Subject Committee Club Voters'Action ActionRecdn.
Ballot. Amendment to provide for succession to
office of Governor. Yes Yes Yes
1950 Amendment to fix salaries of legislators. Yes Yes Yes
1950 Amendment to provide for reapportionment of
representation in legislature. No — No
1952 Ballot. Amendment to create Legislative Emer-
gency Committee for budgetary control. No Yes Yes
1954 Ballot. Amendment to increase number of voter
signatures for constitutional amendment from
8 to 10 per cent. Yes Yes Yes
1954 Ballot. Amendment to permit legislature to fix
salaries of members. Yes Yes No
1954 Ballot. Amendment for division of counties into
sub-districts for election of Senators and Repre-
sentatives. Yes Yes Yes
1956 Ballot. Amendment to provide increase in legis-
lators'pay from S600 to $1200. Yes Yes No
1958 Ballot. Amendment to provide increase in legis-
lators'pay to $1200. ' Yes Yes No
1958 Ballot. Amendment to permit school board
members or employees to serve as members of
legislature. No Yes Yes
1958 Ballot. Amendment to permit county home
rule. Yes Yes Yes
1960 Ballot. Amendment on when elective offices to
become vacant. No No Yes
1960 Ballot. Amendment to provide for increased
pay for legislators. Yes Yes No
1960 Ballot. Amendment to fix commencement of
legislature terms. Yes Yes Yes
1960 Ballot. Amendment to authorize legislature to
propose revised Constitution. Yes Yes Yes
1962 Ballot. Amendment for legislative apportion-
ment. No No No
1962 Ballot. Amendment to permit legislature to fix
compensation. Yes Yes Yes
Voters' attitudes toward change, as well as subjects of amendments, may be
of some interest.
The City Club report most significant and relevant in the present context is
that of November 4, 1960, authorizing the legislature to propose a revised
Constitution.
The purpose was to amend the Constitution to permit the legislature to revise
the Constitution in whole or in part and to refer it to the voters for approval. The
legislature would be empowered to propose revision by a two-thirds vote of each
House, to submit amendments to the people at the same election as amendments
to the revision proposed by the legislature and, alternatively, as an amendment to
the existing Constitution. Such alternative amendments may be proposed by
initiative or as legislative action by a majority vote.
The Committee report reviewed the legislative proposal and procedure, the
background and purpose, the procedure for constitutional amendment, and the
need for constitutional revision; it submitted analysis of the proposal and outlined
arguments for and against it. The analysis prepared by the Office of Legislative
Counsel outlines procedures for proposing to the people revisions of all or part of
the Constitution, an entire new Constitution, or revision of a particular article.
The Committee interviewed only four people and apparently did not have time
for research in depth.
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Majority conclusions and recommendations favored the constitutional amend-
ment authorizing the legislature to propose revisions to the people for adoption.
The majority report was signed by Committee members Gunther Krause, Clarence
Larkin, John M. Swarthout, and Robert L. Weiss (chairman).
The minority report by Eugene J. Watson concluded that the proposed form
of revision was not desirable and that it would substantially remove a substantive
right of the people to pass upon constitutional amendments covering only a single
subject.
The need of constitutional revision was stated in brief and general (and not
very broad or urgent) terms. The report pointed out that many detailed arrange-
ments are included in the Constitution (in contrast to the broad terms of the federal
Constitution), that these require frequent amendment as needs and political ideas
change, that the Constitution becomes confused and outworn, and that at this stage
full revision becomes desirable, if not necessary. The Committee found that the
Oregon Constitution, over a century old and amended over a hundred times, still
serves adequately. Nevertheless, over-all revision becomes increasingly needed as
time goes on, and it would be helpful now, the Committee said, to make the
document "more concise, logical, understandable, and up to date."
